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Abstract: Lasting for over a year the global crisis in financial markets, affected individual countries’ banking systems to a 
different degree. The present article discusses the phenomenon and its effects on the Polish banking system. The aim of the 
article is to present trends, the scale of the crisis and the current level of danger to stability of domestic financial market. The 
result of the research is a synthetic estimation of the level of the financial sector stability, taking into account the risks to 
solvency, liquidity, profitability, and quality loan portfolio and changes in deposits. 




The date of the emergence of the global financial crisis is 
associated with the 14th September 2008, which is the day of 
the  bankruptcy  of  U.S.  investment  bank  Lehman  Brothers. 
Nevertheless,  even  beforehand,  the  concern  was  already 
present  on  the  international  financial  markets.  The  main 
source of the current crisis is associated with the American 
sub-prime market, which was based on financing of real estate 
loans, granted to people with low credit ratings. Despite the 
many  actions  aimed  at  stabilizing  the  situation,  including 
interventions  of  central  banks  in  the  United  States  and  in 
European countries, all the attempts have failed and in a short 
period  of  time,  the  deteriorating  economic  situation  and  a 
collapse in one market quickly disclosed in other parts of the 
world. Those destabilizing consequences are global and they 
are  a  result  of  a  free  movement  of  capital,  as  well  as  the 
ownership  structure  of  financial  institutions  in  which  the 
country  of  origin  was  also  a  “country  of  origin”  of 
destabilization. 
Polish banking system experienced a very difficult period 
in the nineties of the last century. The situation was caused by 
the political and economic transformations. Even in the early 
nineties, almost all banks in Poland were under the control of 
the  Treasury,  granting  credits  mainly  to  the  state-owned 
enterprises, which have proved to be totally unprepared for 
changes. For example, in 1993, there was a total number of 
1740 banks in Poland, where 77 of them were state banks, 10 
were in the hands of foreign owners, and in 1653 were the co-
operative banks. In the asset structure obtained by the above 
mentioned  sector,  state  and  foreign  banks  accounted  for 
93.4% of all assets, and the remaining 6.6% was accounted 
for  by  the  cooperative  banks.  A  very  difficult  financial 
situation of the companies operating those days, their unpaid 
debts towards the banks, high inflation, which e.g. in 1990 
was  686%,  and  high  interest  rates  during  this  period 
amounting to 49% in the quarterly period, resulted in the fact 
that the dominant part of the loan portfolios were based on 
bad loans and the results of these events led to the bankruptcy 
of many banks. It should be stressed that the Polish banking 
crisis in the first half of the nineties had only a local scope and 
its cause was a result of the fact that the Polish economy was 
unprepared to market conditions. Destabilizing consequences 
of  this  crisis  were  lasting  nearly  until  2004  when  Poland 
joined the European Union. 
As for the 30th September 2009, Polish banking system 
had a total of 647 banks, of which 578 are cooperative banks, 
51  commercial  banks  and  18  branches  of  foreign  credit 
institutions. Although the number of cooperative banks is the 
highest, their participation in the sector is not high as their 
assets  constitute  only  5.6%.  Commercial  banks  account  for 
89.1% of assets, and credit institutions for 5.3%. Ownership 
structure of the banking sector looks quite differently than a in 
the 90s. If one was to measure the involvement of banks in the 
banking  sector  by  means  of  measuring  bank’s  assets,  then 
69.4%  of  the  assets  are  from  foreign  investors,  including 
61.8% of investors from European Union countries. What is 
significant  is  that  the  foreign  capital  located  in  the  Polish 
banks  is  dispersed  geographically  (for  example  the  USA 
accounts for only 6.7% of assets), which reduces the risk of 
dependence  of  the  Polish  banking  sector  on  the  economic 
situation of one country of the investor. 
The current Polish economic ties with the rest of Europe 
are strong, mainly due to the joining the European Union. In 
addition, trade and the participation of investors from the U.S. 
banking system is far greater now than in the nineties, which 
leads to a conclusion that the Polish banking system is in a 
greater  danger  in  the  event  of  the  emergence  of  signs  of 
instability  in  the  countries of  investors. For  example, these 
major investors are globally known financial institutions such 
as  AIG  (USA),  Citigroup  (USA),  Fortis  (Belgium),  AIB 
(Ireland), Santander (Spain), which are currently experiencing 
considerable difficulties. 
Macroeconomic situation 
Banking  is  very  strongly  correlated  with  the  economy. 
This follows from the fact that any change in the economic 
and financial situation of depositors and borrowers is almost 
immediately reflected in banks’ balance sheets. 
In  2005-2007, the Polish  economy  was  in  a  phase of  a 
rapid growth. Gross domestic product at the end of the third 
quarter of 2007 was 6.6%, reflecting the investment boom, 
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TABLE 1. MAIN INDICATORS DESCRIBING THE POLISH ECONOMY IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN 
30TH SEPTEMBER 2007 AND 30TH SEPTEMBER 2009 (QUARTERLY DATA). 
  GDP growth  Inflation
  Unemployment   EURO/ZŁ
  $/ZŁ
  WIG *
 
3Q2007  +6.6%  2.3%  11.6%  3.79  2.73  60 368 
4Q2007  +6.6%  4.0%  11.4%  3.60  2.47  55 648 
1Q2008  +6.2%  4.1%  11.1%  3.54  2.28  48 011 
2Q2008  +6.0%  4.6%  9.6%  3.37  2.17  41 146 
3Q2008  +5.1%  4.5%  8.9%  3.39  2.34  37 367 
4Q2008  +3.0%  3.3%  9.5%  4.02  2.97  27 228 
1Q2009  +0.8%  3.6%  10.5%  4.62  3.54  24 036 
2Q2009  +1.1%  3.5%  10.7%  4.51  3.21  30 419 
3Q2009  +1.2%  3.4%  10.8%  4.16  2.85  37 580 
Source: www.money.pl   
Note: * WIG - the Warsaw Stock Exchange Index. 
 
TABLE 2.  SELECTED MONETARY INDICATORS IN POLAND BETWEEN 3Q2007 - 3Q2009  
  Lombard credit  Warsaw Interbank Offer 
Rate 3 Month rate         
(WIBOR 3M) 
Interest rate of zloty deposits in commercial banks 
with agreed maturity up to 2 years 
3Q2007  6.25%  5.10%  3.3% 
4Q2007  6.50%  5.68%  3.5% 
1Q2008  7.25%  6.15%  3.7% 
2Q2008  7.50%  6.65%  4.0% 
3Q2008  7.50%  6.63%  4.6% 
4Q2008  6.50%  5.88%  6.1% 
1Q2009  5.25%  4.17%  6.2% 
2Q2009  5.00%  4.44%  5.4% 
3Q2009  5.00%  4.18%  5.3% 
Source: www.money.pl ; CSO Statistical Bulletin, 2009.  
 
TABLE 3. MAJOR ECONOMIC PARAMETERS CHARACTERIZING THE POLISH BANKING SYSTEM                                     
IN THE PERIOD 3Q2007 - 3Q2009. 
  Total balance sheet         
(mln Euro) 




Financial result          
(mln Euro) 
The share of 




3Q2007  194 191.9  98 144.7  101 789.8  2 621.4  4.4%  11.8% 
4Q2007  198 840.5  104 827.0  106 888.2  3 418.6  4.1%  12.1% 
1Q2008  209 606.9  107 845.7  114 706.5  2 789.0  4.0%  11.5% 
2Q2008  220 373.3  110 864.5  122 524.7  2 159.3  3.8%  10.8% 
3Q2008  234 246.3  115 394.0  132 399.9  3 164.2  3.5%  11.5% 
4Q2008  260 442.2  123 536.1  148 394.5  3 483.7  3.5%  10.8% 
1Q2009  268 907.6  127 873.9  157 463.4  500.5   3.8%  11.2% 
2Q2009  263 050.5  131 135.3  156 631.5  1 325.4  4.2%  12.5% 
3Q2009  261 422.2  131 209.1  156 874.7  1 751.9  4.9%  13.1% 
Source: UKNF 2007-2009.  
 
Since the beginning of 2008, however, this index began to 
decrease gradually, which was a sign of “overheating”, and 
this  was  particularly  evident  in  the  growth  of  prices  for 
investment goods. For example, housing prices in Warsaw at 
that time already exceeded 3 000 Euros per square meter, and 
this trend that favoured by low, compared to previous periods 
and still falling, foreign exchange rates (Table 1). The first 
signs  of  the  upcoming  economic  imbalances  were  already 
visible in the fourth quarter of 2007. This conclusion can be 
drawn from the observation the level of the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange  Index  (WIG),  being  a  stock  market  index  of 
companies.  It  is  calculated  as  a  weighted  average  of  daily 
quotations on the Stock Exchange in Warsaw (for example, on 
17th  November  2009, WIG  covered  313  companies  with  a 
total value around 37 billion Euros). Since the beginning of 
2008  the  above  mentioned  index  steadily  declined,  and 
between the third quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 
2008  its  decrease  exceeded  32%.  Then,  between  the  third 
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exceeded 60%. Crisis is also visible in the GDP decrease as its 
figure is  six times lower than  in the prior two  years,  even 
though GDP growth rate has continued to be positive. There is 
also a noticeable decline in inflation, which is, inter alia, a 
result  of  the  inhibition  of  consumption,  and  a  rising 
unemployment rate, which at the end of the third quarter of 
2009 rose by one fifth compared to the third quarter of 2008. 
Exchange rate of the zloty against the euro and U.S. dollar 
also showed an obvious increasing trend, and its rate level of 
the  first  quarter  of  2009  corresponded  to  the  one  from 
December 2004. 
Equally  significant  changes  can  be  found  in  the  money 
market.  Lombard  rate  fixed  by  the  Polish  National  Bank 
(NBP) in 3Q2007 was 6.25% and the end of 3Q2008 showed 
an increasing trend. Since 4Q2008 there was a decrease in the 
interest  rates,  which  may  be  explained  as  an  attempt  to 
maintain  the  momentum  of  investment  growth.  Already  in 
June 2008 international bank market reacted sharply, initially 
towards  rumours  and  then  towards  the  news  about  the 
bankruptcy  of  Lehman  Brothers,  through  the  loss  of 
confidence between banks. This was manifested through an 
increase of WIBOR 3M from 5.1% at the end of 3Q2007 to 
6.63% at the end of 3Q2008. In November 2008 The Bank 
Guarantee Fund increased the guaranteed amount of deposits 
from 22 500 to 50 000 Euros in order to avoid an avalanche of 
deposit withdrawals from banks, which could lead to a loss of 
liquidity by this sector (Table 2). 
Since the end of 2Q2009 some signs of stabilisation are 
visible.  Gross  domestic  product  has  ceased  to  decline, 
showing little  signs  of  growth, inflation stabilized  at  3.4%, 
strengthening  the  zloty  against  foreign  currencies,  and  the 
index WIG began to show an upward trend. Similar signs of 
stabilization can be observed when it comes to the price of 
money (lombard credit), which in 3Q2009 declined by 0.25% 
when compared to the previous period. A significant risk, i.e. 
high and rising levels of unemployment, still remains and it is 
at the level of less than 11%. 
The banking system 
When  analyzing  the  impact  exerted  by  the  crisis  on 
international financial markets on banks operating in Poland, 
it  is  clear  that  these  banks  were  not  directly  linked  to  the 
subprime credit market. This relationship, however, occurred 
indirectly through a “parent companies”, which at the end of 
2007 were institutions in the need of a rapid recapitalization. 
In  a  situation  where  banks  operating  in  Poland  in  2008 
showed record profits, the kind of actions that were expected 
from the “parent companies”, were the ones which would be 
demand  high  dividends.  This  action  were  prevented  by  the 
Polish Financial Supervision Authority.  
It  is  important  to  mention  that  throughout  the  global 
financial  crisis,  none  of  the  Polish  banks  was  subject  to 
insolvency proceedings and neither the Central Bank nor the 
government gave any financial assistance to any bank. 
However, the crisis had adversely affected the situation of 
the  banking  sector  and  a  negative  scenario  of  a  worsening 
situation is still possible. Although the total balance sheet of 
banks in the period between 3Q2007 and 2Q2009 increased, 
the  pace  has  been  significantly  weakened,  and  in  3Q2009 
there has been a loss of 2 billion Euro in the balance sheet. A 
similar situation developed in the deposit market, especially in 
the period following the disclosure of the crisis. Though in 
this case the initial factor of the rapid growth of deposits has 
proved to be just a crisis, and the cause of this phenomenon, 
which lasted over the period from 3Q2008 to 3Q2009, was the 
transfer  of  funds  from  investment  funds  into  banks,  where 
they were located in the form of deposits. The collapse of  an 
inter-bank money market and the higher interest rates offered 
by banks was a significant factor in the increase of deposits in 
the banking sector. (Table 2.). That is one of the reasons why 
the period ranging from end of the 2008 to the beginning of 
2009 was named “the deposit war” period (Table 3). 
In the case of loans the situation was somewhat different, 
since till the end of the first quarter of the present year (2009), 
the state of the loans showed an increasing trend. This trend, 
however,  was  not  the  sole  effect  of  the  active  bank  loan 
lending action. As a result of the increase of the interest rate 
for loans in the first three quarters of 2008 some borrowers 
began  to  have  problems  repayments.  Banks thus  prolonged 
periods of credit, but it was only a short-term success, because 
in longer periods of time, banks are obliged to create reserves 
for such loans, which negatively affects not only the financial 
result, but also banks’ state of the balance sheet. In 3Q2009 
the increase in loans was effectively blocked and banks have 
shown  profit  lower  by  a  half  when  compared  to  the  same 
period  of  the  previous  year.  However,  it  seems  that  the 
negative phenomena associated with the deterioration of the 
profitability of the industry have been halted. This is because 
the comparison of the sector after the first quarter of 2009 
and  2008, shows that the outcome of the previous year was 
more than five times higher than today. 
 The  growth  in  loans  in  a  situation  of  risk  in  the  loan 
portfolio in general is a worrying phenomenon. While in the 
period  between  3Q2007  and  4Q2008  this  index  showed  a 
favourable  downward  trend,  2009  is  characterized  by  a 
reversal of this trend, and at the end of 2009 it is likely to 
exceed  5%,  which  amongst  others,  is  the  result  of  high 
unemployment and more bankruptcies of enterprises, than was 
the case in previous years.  
In such circumstances, it is difficult to expect an increase 
in profitability of banks and the sector as a whole. Banks have 
adopted  a  strategy  of  survival.  Throughout  the  analysed 
period ratio of deposits towards loans remained unfavourable. 
This poses a threat to liquidity, because in such relationships, 
the banks gave more loans than they had deposits. Coverage 
ratio of loans by deposits was less than 100% and at the end 
of  3Q2009  reached  84%,  even  though  before  the  crisis  it 
exceeded 90%. This phenomenon is also the result of financial 
difficulties of banks with foreign capital operating in Poland 
as before, their owners, kept significantly helping the daughter 
banks by giving them the necessary capital to finance loans. 
As  far  as  the  solvency  of  the  sector  is  concerned, it  is 
much higher than in previous periods. This is due to retention 
of profits in between 2007 - 2008, which increased the banks’ 
equity.  According  to  the  Polish  Financial  Supervision 
Authority, only 3 banks showed a solvency ratio below 8%, of 
which  one  was  a  commercial  bank  and  the  second  was  a 
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Conclusion 
Global  financial  crisis  has  negatively  influenced  the 
financial position of the banking sector in Poland, though its 
effects were minimal. When summing up the above observed 
phenomena, it shall be noted that the Polish banking system 
remains stable and solvent. As a result of the stop in profits in 
previous  years  and  a  raise  in  equity  the  ability  to  absorb 
potential  losses  was  strengthened,  which  might  possibly 
develop in the future.  
The  main  danger  for  the  Polish  banking  sector  is  the 
external environment, in particular, hardly stable situation on 
international  financial  markets.  It  may  be  argued  that  the 
greatest  threats  to  international  financial  institutions  have 
been identified and actions of central banks and governments 
have stabilized the situation, but the crisis has highlighted a 
number of weaknesses in the banks, which should strengthen 
loan  procedures,  paying  careful  attention  not  only  to  the 
creditworthiness, but also the security of credit. Another weak 
point  proved  to  be  the  regulation  of  risk  management, 
especially market risks. Bank strategies are also in the need of 
reconstruction,  which  should  be  based  on  long-term 
sustainability, rather than being focused on the profitability of 
operations  (UKNF,  2009).  Threats  are  also  associated  with 
positive information about managing the financial crisis well, 
because they may cause a return to more aggressive policies 
aimed  at  profit,  and  inefficiency  and  to  mitigate  the  credit 
terms. This threat is so real and dangerous as for Polish banks, 
affected  by  the  crisis  to  a  little  extent,  it  may  cause  false 
feeling  of  power  company,  “genius”  boards,  as  well  as 
certainty of an incoming aid from the government and new 
crisis regulators. 
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